megaphone-150254_1280The Minnesota Board of Professional Responsibility is looking for an experienced lawyer (at least 10 years’ experience – must include civil litigation or prosecution experience).

Deadline tomorrow!

pinkie_pie_bubble ponyUpdated post (November 14, 2016): Plaintiff Bubble Pony hopes for a more receptive audience before Sr. U.S. District Court Judge David S. Doty (D. Minn.) than BP got before U.S. Mag. Judge Franklin L. Noel on BP’s second motion to amend its complaint.

As discussed below, Plaintiff BP (Mr. Patrick Glynn), a digital game programmer, exchanged text messages with Defendant Facepunch discussing the financial terms of Glynn’s work for Facepunch. Glynn seeks to hold Facepunch to “the deal” allegedly negotiated in the text message exchanges. Judge Noel denied Glynn’s motion to amend his complaint, essentially concluding that, even with the newly discovered evidence, the alleged offer and the alleged acceptance were still too vague to establish a legally enforceable contract as to profit-sharing.

Here linked is Facepunch’s response to Glynn’s objection to Noel’s decision denying Glynn’s motion to amend. And here linked is BP/Glynn’s reply.

I predict that Facepunch will win before Judge Doty, as it did before Judge Noel. Here’s why: our civil justice system can and should set incentives for people and businesses to negotiate and to adhere to clear-cut agreements. Setting up a system in which a party can cobble together a supposedly binding contract from text message snippets exchanged over years, and the like, should be discouraged. It is an open invitation to protracted and expensive disputes.

It may be true that Facepunch got more than it deserved from the work that BP/Glynn did for Facepunch. But maybe BP/Glynn is responsible for its failure to make the rules of the engagement clearer from the start.


Money FightThe world’s largest legal search firm, Major Lindsey & Africa, has published its 2016 Compensation Report (linked here) and it is generally good news for large firm lawyers. And good news for these lawyers means good news for all lawyers in private practice.

Average compensation for all respondents was reported as $877,000, up 22% from 2014 ($716,000). Median compensation also supposedly rose dramatically, climbing 21%, from $475,000 in 2014 to $575,000 in 2016. The average billing rate for all respondents was $685, up $77 (+13%) from 2014 ($608).

Dig into the 121-page report for details. Who gets paid more, men or women? White people vs. people of color or “Mixed Races”?  You already know the correct answers to these questions. But you might find the specifics and deeper detail interesting.

One caveat: this survey was sent to thousands of lawyers and MLA got responses from just 3%. And there is no indication of any kind of verification or validation of the information provided by this non-random sample. Do you imagine that this sub-group, the 3% survey respondents, yields accurate data for the entire group? I am not trained in statistical validation but it seems to me important to keep in mind that this information might be skewed (and particularly inflated and inaccurate as to the Minnesota market, in particular).


fig-1703628_1280No. Kicking a man in the testicles is not “sexual abuse,” as the term is used in Minn. Stat. 541.073 (“Actions for Damages Due to Sexual Abuse”) according to the Minnesota Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision this week. Therefore, the court held, Plaintiff Mark Schaefer’s claim against his past employer for the crotch kick he endured (by fellow employee Donovan Schultz) was subject to the two-year statute of limitation for battery, rather than the six-year term for “sexual abuse.”

The allegations in this employment decision are strange. Apparently striking one another in the testicles was a form of “play” for at a least a couple of workers at Cargill Kitchen Solutions, Inc.

The analysis in the decision of how a kick to the groin is NOT sexual abuse also strikes me as a little odd.


BedBack in January, we covered an on-going battle between Minnesota-based bed behemoth, Select Comfort, and a smaller competitor (one of many such battles that Select Comfort has waged to protect its Sleep Number™ empire).

Game on. Trial is set to begin on November 29, 2106. (Happy Thanksgiving 2016 to the warring lawyers!)

That means that the litigants are now setting the stage for trial, launching their barrages of motions in limine, trying to blow up some of the “evidence” proposed for use at trial by the other side.

Many questions arise, for example, is it in fact evidence that defendants conducted some of their business using pseudonyms? Should they get to exclude any such information at trial?


Slimed Person cropped SLIMESylabus [sic]

When the business entities that were utilized in a Ponzi scheme filed for bankruptcy, a plaintiff lender-investor lacks authority to bring fraud-related claims arising out of the Ponzi scheme against an earlier lender-investor, absent an allegation of an injury separate and distinct from an injury suffered by the entities. Such fraud-related cause of action [sic] is derivative and belongs to the bankruptcy estate.

The quote is the summary of a published Minnesota Court of Appeals decision this week ruling against a lender called Greenpond South LLC (“Greenpond”) in Greenpond’s lawsuit against another lender, General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”).

The description of the legal holding is bland and technical but the decision reflects underlying allegations of serious wrongdoing by the GECC, the winning party to this lawsuit.

To summarize, GECC was a lender to Minnesota’s most famous swindler, Tom Petters. GECC caught on to Petters’ fraud. GECC allegedly kept Petters’ secret until it had recovered the money it lent. GECC also knowingly provided Petters with a “To Whom It May Concern” letter praising Petters’ character, knowing that the praise was undeserved and that Petters would use that letter to defraud other potential lenders. Although the decision does not say so, it does not appear that GECC did anything to stop Petters’ ongoing fraud once it had gotten its own money out.

The basic holding of the Greenpond v. GECC case, however, is not that GECC did nothing wrong. Roughly, it is that the Bankruptcy Trustee brought its own action against GECC, which it settled. In other words, at least in theory, GECC already paid the piper for its alleged role in the scheme. Greenpond cannot sue GECC a second time.


St_Jude_Medical_pacemaker_with_ruler2As we said last month, St. Jude Medical has brought a complaint against short-seller Muddy Waters Consulting and others for false advertising, conspiracy and the resultant manipulation of the public markets. Essentially, St. Jude’s 33-page lawsuit alleges that Muddy Waters’ business model is to malign companies, like St. Jude Medical, with false or misleading public criticism of their business practices or products, so that Muddy Waters, which has “shorted” stock in the target company (see below), can make money.

The basic idea of shorting  or short-selling is that an investor sells stock he does not actually own on Date 1, with a promise to the buyer that he will deliver the stock on later Date 2. If the share price drops between Date 1 and Date 2, the short-seller makes money because buyer, who is correspondingly going “longer” on the stock, is bound by the Date 1 sale price. If the share price goes up between Date 1 and Date 2, the short seller takes a loss. The details of short-selling are, of course, more complicated.

At issue in St. Jude v. Muddy Waters, are statements by Muddy Waters people questioning the safety of St. Jude implantable cardiac rhythm management (“CRM”) devices, colloquially known as pacemakers. Was this merely a ploy to drive St. Jude’s price down? Muddy Waters has now filed its answer.


handgun-231699_1280Danna Back dated someone on and off for several years who, in judicial opinons, goes by the name of “D.H.”  Back and D.H.’s was a rocky relationship and in 2006 Back moved out of the house that they co-owned and shared.

Then Ms. Back started dating Nick Super who appears to have toxically combined anger management issues with a love of guns.

Super was not fond of D.H. and Back knew that. She knew that Super had threatened D.H. with a gun several times, Super had fired shots at D.H.’s garage, and Back knew that Super was “known to pull his gun out on anybody.”

For reasons best known by herself, at around 3:00 a.m. on January 1, 2007, Back decided to go to D.H.’s house. Guess who she called to give her a ride to D.H.’s house? And guess what happened then?


Arrowsmith's_map_of_the_world_(1812)Personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the 21st century is something of a pet peeve of mine (most recent post here (linking to still more posts)). To decide whether they can impose jurisdiction over a party, courts analyze whether the party could “reasonably foresee” being “haled” into a court within the jurisdiction. My most recent post on the subject applauds a move in the right direction by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That is, I believe the rule should be:

When a foreign company knowingly engages in business with, say, a Minnesota company (knowing it is engaging with the company and knowing the company is in Minnesota), for any protracted period of time (a vague term that might not be determinable with precision by courts ever), in the absence of a contractual exclusive forum selection clause identifying a non-Minnesota forum, the foreign company should be charged with knowledge that, if a dispute ever arises with the Minnesota company over their business interactions, the foreign company might have to defend a lawsuit in Minnesota.

Doesn’t that make sense to you?

In contrast, the recent linked decision makes no sense to me.




Update (October 20, 2016): Here is the Shattuck school’s response to the motion for one trial by three plaintiffs, all allegedly sexually abused by the same Shattuck teacher (I discuss plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate in the original post):

From Shattuck’s perspective, the Motion to Consolidate for Trial is a prejudicial attempt to create a montage of a single Plaintiff composed of the testimony of several. If the Motion is granted, cautionary or limiting instructions would have little to no effect as the jury blurs together facts on foreseeability, damages, and other material issues in a way that would significantly prejudice Shattuck and create a composite Plaintiff who does not exist. This is not a class-action. These are three separate cases commenced by three different Plaintiffs, each with unique testimony on his contacts with Seibel and therefore unique claims of liability and damages.

The school argues that allowing the three plaintiffs’ lawsuits to be consolidated for trial would “effectively creat[e] a single Plaintiff whose claims would be virtually impossible to defend.” That seems to me to be an unjustifiable overstatement. I do not believe it is unreasonable or unlikely to expect one jury to be able to separate and distinguish three plaintiffs’ claims. I am predicting a win for the plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate. We’ll see…

Original post (October 12, 2016): I have repeatedly described civil trial as staging a play (most recently, here) with no rehearsals and with some of the actors and stagehands (that is, one’s adversaries) determined to make the production a failure.

The judge always plays a central role, literally and figuratively, in these productions not only in the performance but in the pre-performance staging. A great many of a judge’s decisions on logistics are determined by court rules, the rules of evidence, and other written guides. But there is no way that any set of written rules can apply to the multitude of decisions required to stage a trial.

Some judges receive high praise for their expertise in conducting trials, their perfomance before trials and during them. Other judges are ridiculed or even excoriated by trial lawyers because some fail to fill the vacuum of decision-maker before trial (and/or during trial). They are absent. They dither. They are not in control. They are inexperienced or they just do not care. And, of course, other judges are accused of bias, rightly or wrongly. (These criticisms are under one’s breath or private, of course. One risks repercussions for criticism of judges, both formally and informally.)

U.S. District Court Judge Ann D. Montgomery  (D. Minn.) enjoys broad admiration and respect throughout the Minnesota bar. And she now presides over the pre-trial skirmishing in the Doe v. Shattuck-St. Mary cases…