The concept of “justice delayed is justice denied” is ancient. But what does this broadly accepted generality mean in any particular case? In civil litigation, there are three general time-frames: (1) “emergency” — this is what temporary restraining orders are for; (2) “let’s cut to the chase” — that is, getting a decision or remedy short of trial, and that is what preliminary injunctive relief or summary adjudication are for; (3) and then there’s “all in good time” — 1-15 years to get a case through trial and to final judgment for a great deal of civil litigation in either state or federal courts.
“Time is money” is another related widely acknowledged truism. And, consequently, invoking the first concept expressly or implicitly (“Justice delayed…”) but with the second concept clearly in mind (“$$$”), civil litigants sometimes push as best they can to fall within time-frame #1, and, if not #1, then #2, because all wish to avoid the third time-frame if at all possible. But maybe there’s something in between the time-critical emergency of time-frame #1 and the “let’s cut to the chase” time-frame?
Probably not. In CHS v. PetroNet, the scheduled Nov. 10 hearing on Plaintifff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff’s counsel argued on Thurs. 9/23, was too far off under the circumstances of the case. The same day, defense counsel filed a spirited response to Plaintiff’s request for “expedited treatment.” The next day, with his customary promptness and directness, Judge Kyle rejected the Plaintiff’s request (Plaintiff’s request is here, response is here, order is here).